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IS THE CLASS ACTION REALLY DEAD? IS THAT GOOD OR
BAD FOR CLASS MEMBERS?
Georgene Vairo∗
ABSTRACT
Recent Supreme Court decisions have tightened up the standards for
obtaining class certification and virtually eliminate class arbitration as well.
However, while the Court has made it more difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
use class resolution of claims as a prosecutorial tool, the lower federal courts
appear to relax certification standards when the parties seek to certify a
settlement class. Because of the preclusive power of a class action, which
binds all class members who do not opt out, the class action remains a potent
settlement tool. The 2014 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium panel that served
as the foundation for this paper, “Binding the Future: Global Settlements and
the Death of Representative Litigation,” asked, however, whether class
settlements are bad for class members.
This Article begins by analyzing the Supreme Court’s certification
decisions and agrees with most commentators that although class actions are
not dead, the device’s utility as a prosecution tool has been compromised.
However, the Article then shows that certification of class actions for
settlement purposes is alive and well. Finally, the Article identifies possible
alternatives to the use of class actions. Although much attention has been (and
should be) directed at the fairness of proposed settlements, the Article suggests
that it is fortunate that the lower federal courts are not applying class
certification standards as stringently in the class settlement context. This is
because, despite all the problems inherent in class action practice, class
actions remain the best of a range of options for protecting the rights of class
members, particularly in low-value claim cases.

∗ David P. Leonard Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I wish to thank the Emory Law
Journal for inviting me to participate in the 2014 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, and for the help of its
editors in the preparation of this Article. I also want to thank Professor Rich Freer for being such a supportive
friend and colleague over the decades we have shared in academia. He has always pushed me to be the best
that I can be.
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INTRODUCTION
There seems to be a bit of schizophrenia in the world of class actions. On
the one hand, corporate defendants hate them; on the other, they love them.1
When a class complaint is filed against a corporate defendant, it will do all it
can to prevent class certification, otherwise known as the nuclear bomb the
plaintiff seeks to hang over its head.2 But, when it suits their needs, corporate
defendants may try to achieve a global peace by negotiating a class settlement
with the plaintiff class’s attorneys.3 Similarly, the 2014 Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium, to which I was honored to be invited, brought together leading
scholars and practitioners to discuss whether, on the one hand, class actions are
really dead, but on the other, whether class settlements are a bad thing for
plaintiffs.4
It is no secret that the United States Supreme Court has made obtaining
class certification and group dispute resolution more difficult. Over the last
several Terms, the Court has decided several lines of class action cases.5 Two
1 See Georgene Vairo, What Goes Around, Comes Around: From the Rector of Barkway to Knowles, 32
REV. LITIG. 721, 723–24 (2013).
2 See id. at 723.
3 See id.
4 See The 2014 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, EMORY L.J., http://law.emory.edu/elj/symposium.
html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
5 In the 2010 Term, the Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct.
2368 (2011); and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). The Court took a break in the
next Term, but returned with five cases in the following Term: Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans &
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Standard Fire
Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013); and Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013). During the most recent
Term, the Court issued two opinions: Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014)
and Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). And the Court has
more in store. It granted certiorari in two more class action related cases in the current Term: Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 730 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2013) (petition for rehearing en banc denied, 4–4),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1788 (2014) (No. 13-719) and Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2876
(2014) (No. 13-1174) (granting certiorari in connection with the decision in In re LIBOR-Based Financial
Instruments Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 13-3565(L); 13-3636(Con.), 2013 WL 9557843 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2013)).
First, the issue in Dart Cherokee is the defendant’s burden with respect to the amount in controversy
requirement when removing under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). The Tenth Circuit allowed
a remand of the case because the defendant pleaded, but did not present proof, that the $5 million amount in
controversy requirement was satisfied. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating, Co. v. Owens, No. 13-603, 2013
WL 8609250, at *1 (10th Cir. June 20, 2013), denying perm. app. from No. 12-4157-JAR-JPO, 2013 WL
2237740, at *1 (D. Kan. May 21, 2013). Second, in Gelboim, the district court dismissed some individual
plaintiffs’ claims. The Second Circuit determined sua sponte that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ appeal
because a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 had not been issued and because the orders appealed
from did not dispose of all claims in the consolidated action. 2013 WL 9557843, at *1. Certiorari was granted
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lines of cases that are of particular importance to the issues this Article
addresses—one line pertains to class certification requirements under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23, and the other pertains to class arbitration—have
upped the ante for plaintiffs seeking to use the power of this ultimate
aggregation device to obtain a large recovery for class members who often
otherwise have claims too small to justify individual actions.6 A subset of the
class certification requirements line is a series of cases on securities class
actions that has been relatively pro-class friendly.7 The third line parses some
of the intricacies of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and
federalism issues.8 This line of cases has an impact on whether a particular
class action is litigated in state or federal court, which, in turn, may tilt the
equation in favor of or against class certification because plaintiffs’ counsel
tend to perceive state courts as relatively more class action friendly.9 Although
this Article will not address this line of cases directly, it will discuss the most
recent Supreme Court case, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics
Corp.10—in which the Court unanimously held that a state attorney general’s

as to “[w]hether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other
suits immediately appealable.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gelboim, 134 S. Ct. 2876 (No. 13-1174),
2014 WL 1246714.
6 The most significant general class certification decisions are Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 and Comcast, 133
S. Ct. 1426. Symczyk decided that a full offer of judgment in an FLSA collective action case moots the class
claims. 133 S. Ct. at 1532. The significant class arbitration decisions are Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 and
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304.
7 The securities cases include: Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179; Smith, 131 S. Ct. 2368; Amgen, 133 S. Ct.
1184; and Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398.
8 The CAFA cases are Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 and Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736. Smith addressed the
preclusive effect of a federal court’s denial of class certification on a subsequent class action brought by class
members in a state court. 131 S. Ct. at 2375, 2377.
It is by no means clear that state courts are as friendly as plaintiffs’ attorneys hope. California, which is
listed as the number one “Judicial Hellhole,” see AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013–
2014, at 3 (2013), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf,
seems to be tightening up as well. In Duran v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, the California Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed reversal of the trial court’s certification of a class. 325 P.3d 916, 934 (Cal. 2014). The
trial court had relied on faulty statistical sampling as the basis for overcoming commonality issues. Id. at 945–
46. In Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court approved class certification
of one subclass, remanded for further consideration another, and affirmed a refusal to certify a third subclass in
a wage and hour dispute, thereby evincing a more nuanced approach to class certification. 273 P.3d 513, 521
(Cal. 2012).
9 See generally GEORGENE M. VAIRO, THE COMPLETE CAFA: ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTS UNDER
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, at 2–5 (2011) (supplement to MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed.
1997)) (remarking on the “unprecedented degree of forum shopping” undertaken by plaintiffs’ lawyers in the
wake of Amchem, as they sought out state courts that “might be more amenable to class certifications”).
10 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014).
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parens patriae action is not removable under CAFA—because it may provide
the foundation for an alternative to class actions.11
The panel upon which I served dealt with the problem of class settlements:
“Binding the Future: Global Settlements and the Death of Representative
Litigation.” Our charge was as follows:
This panel will consider the role of settlements that purport to
bind future potential members of a given class. As increasingly
popular mechanisms for comprehensive dispute resolution, global
settlements provide a powerful tool for corporations and other
entities to bring a swift and decisive end to drawn-out complex
litigation. However, these agreements foreclose litigants, whose
individual causes of action may not accrue for years after the
settlement is concluded, from seeking judicial or arbitral remedies.
Panelists will weigh the vast economic benefits such settlements
bring to corporations with the attendant prejudice such agreements
impose on unknowing and unwilling citizens with concrete and often
compelling injuries.12

In my view, it is somewhat ironic that the focus of this panel was supposed
to be on whether global settlements are fair when they purportedly bind class
members. If class actions are dead, how can there be any global settlements?
And are we talking about actual binding effect, such as when a court blesses a
global settlement, or effective global resolution in quasi-class actions, like
Zyprexa13 or in mass actions?14
This article will first review the recent United States Supreme Court cases
to determine how moribund class actions actually are. The keynote speaker at
the Thrower Symposium, Professor Arthur Miller, passionately argued that the
Supreme Court’s decisions cutting back on class resolution are unfounded and

11

Id. at 744–45; see also infra Part III.C.4.
Description on file with the Emory Law Journal; see also Emory Law Journal, Binding the Future:
Global Settlements and the Death of Representative Litigation, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014) https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=7MX5ngi8tZI.
13 See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403–04 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The individual
Zyprexa user litigation has been administered as a quasi-class action.”). In this decision, the court highlighted
that it had described these proceedings as a “quasi-class action” in previous opinions. See id. (citing In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451
F. Supp. 2d 458, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
14 See infra Part III.C.3.
12
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unfortunate because they choke off access to justice for large groups of persons
whose small claims will now go without a remedy.15 Not surprisingly, because
class actions are so controversial, the panelists on the other panels, In a Class
by Itself: Has the Roberts Court Slammed the Courthouse Door on Class
Actions?16 and Stand Alone or Stand Down: Consumer Arbitration Agreements
and the Demise of Collective Dispute Resolution17 were divided on the merits
and demerits of the Court’s decisions.
My review of the Court’s cases sets the stage for arguing that class actions
are not dead but that their utility as a litigation prosecution device has been
curtailed. Additionally, the possibility of successfully arguing that class
arbitration is appropriate is close to nil. But, the courts have been less stringent
post-Dukes when deciding whether to certify a class for settlement purposes.18
After a review of courts of appeals cases approving settlement classes, the
Article returns to the central focus of our panel: whether class settlements are
bad for class members.
I. THE TIGHTENING CLASS ACTION NOOSE
A. General Class Action Standards
Unquestionably, the most important case dealing with class certification
standards is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.19 That 5–4 decision, with the
majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, redefined the meaning of
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).20 Previously, as Justice Ginsburg noted in
her dissent, the commonality requirement was among the easiest for plaintiffs
to satisfy.21 Now, under Dukes, when faced with a motion for class
15 See Arthur R. Miller, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Keynote Lecture at the Emory Law Journal
2014 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: American Dispute Resolution in 2020: The Death of Group
Vindication of the Law? (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92ICycQeFXc.
16 See Emory Law Journal, In a Class by Itself: Has the Roberts Court Slammed the Courthouse Door on
Class Actions?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Edpzj_1QGWg.
17 See Emory Law Journal, Stand Alone or Stand Down: Consumer Arbitration Agreements and the
Demise of Collective Dispute Resolution, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEvGQb2mGM.
18 See infra Part II.D.
19 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
20 See id. at 2551. The Court also unanimously ruled that the class could not be certified under
Rule 23(b)(2) class because it sought monetary damages that may only be sought in Rule 23(b)(3) damages
class actions. See id. at 2557.
21 See id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion
with the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no
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certification, the district court must engage in a “rigorous analysis” to ensure
that the plaintiff has proven all elements of Rule 23.22 The Court found that
“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard” but rather requires that
“[a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are
in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”23
Moreover, the district court must look to the merits of the case when there
is an overlap between the Rule 23 commonality requirement and the plaintiffs’
merits contentions. Both the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination case and the
commonality element would turn on whether Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.24 And, according to the majority, the plaintiff failed
to prove a common question for certification purposes:
Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of employment
decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for
all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that
examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a
common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.25

Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, criticized the majority for
conflating the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance of common questions requirement,
applicable only in damages class actions, with the threshold Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality requirement.26 According to Justice Ginsburg, the majority’s
approach inappropriately focused on the dissimilarities among class members
rather than the similarities.27
Two years later, most commentators thought that Comcast,28 an antitrust
case, would finish what Justice Scalia started in Dukes by tightening up the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement29 and by making it clear that

longer ‘easily satisfied.’ Rule 23(b)(3) certification requires, in addition to the four 23(a) findings,
determinations that ‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members’ and that ‘a class action is superior to other available methods for . . .
adjudicating the controversy.’” (alteration in original) (footnote and citation omitted)).
22 Id. at 2551–52 (majority opinion).
23 Id. at 2551.
24 See id. at 2552.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 2567.
28 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
29 Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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plaintiffs’ experts on certification issues must meet the Daubert test for the
admissibility of expert evidence.30 Again, the Comcast Court split 5–4, with
Justice Scalia again writing the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg writing
a dissent.31 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent detailed the confusing procedural history
of the case in the Supreme Court and concluded that the Court should have
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted because the Court granted
certiorari on an issue other than one that Comcast had presented in its petition,
and then did not answer its own reformulated question presented.32 More
importantly, and she has proven to be correct for the most part, the majority
opinion broke no real ground.33
According to Justice Ginsburg, the majority vacated class certification of
the damages class merely because the plaintiffs’ expert’s theory of damages
did not match the remaining theory of liability. No big deal, Justice Ginsburg
suggested: “Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”34 Thus, the need
to consider “individual damages calculations should not scuttle class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”35 Therefore, the majority’s holding does not
prevent certification of a liability class, as opposed to a damages class.36 And,
many courts have adopted Justice Ginsburg’s view.37

30

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426.
32 See id. at 1435–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1441 (“Because the parties did not fully
argue the question the Court now answers, all Members of the Court may lack a complete understanding of the
model or the meaning of related statements in the record. The need for focused argument is particularly strong
here where, as we have said, the underlying considerations are detailed, technical, and fact-based. The Court
departs from our ordinary practice, risks inaccurate judicial decisionmaking, and is unfair to respondents and
the courts below. For these reasons, we would not disturb the Court of Appeals’ judgment and, instead, would
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.”).
33 See id. at 1436.
34 Id. at 1437.
35 Id. (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:54, at 205 (5th ed. 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36 See id. at 1437 (“In particular, when adjudication of questions of liability common to the class will
achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are
not provable in the aggregate.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“[A] fraud
perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a
class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the
damages suffered by individuals within the class.”).
37 See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3) did not require a formula for classwide measurement of damages); Leyva v. Medline
Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court’s denial of class certification).
31
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B. Securities Class Actions
The Supreme Court also decided a series of relatively pro-plaintiff
certification cases in the context of securities class actions. All these cases
revolved around the extent to which a plaintiff may invoke the
fraud-on-the-market theory. To prove a securities violation under the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5, an investor must show that it relied
on a defendant’s misrepresentation when deciding whether to buy or sell a
security.38 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,39 the Supreme Court found that requiring
proof of direct reliance by each plaintiff or class member “would place an
unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on [a] plaintiff who has traded on
an impersonal market.”40 Thus, the Court adopted a fraud-on-the-market
theory, which permits securities-fraud plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable
presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding
securities traded in an efficient market.41 The fraud-on-the-market theory
facilitates the certification of securities-fraud class actions.42 This is because
this theory permits reliance to be proved on a classwide basis, rather than
requiring each class member to prove reliance individually, which would, in
turn, create a predominance problem for class certification purposes.43
In 2011, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), the
Supreme Court held unanimously that securities-fraud plaintiffs are not
required to prove loss causation—a causal connection between the defendant’s
misrepresentations and the plaintiffs’ economic losses—to establish that
reliance was capable of resolution on a common, classwide basis.44 Loss
causation addresses an issue different from whether an investor relied on the
defendant’s misrepresentations.45 Thus, proving loss causation was not a
precondition for invoking Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance.46
Two years later, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust
Funds, a 6–3 majority of the Court ruled that securities-fraud plaintiffs have no
obligation to prove at the class certification stage that a defendant’s
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191–92 (2013).
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Id. at 245.
See id. at 241–49.
See id. at 242.
Id.
131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
See id. at 2186.
See id.
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misrepresentations and omissions were material.47 According to the majority,
proof of materiality is not needed to ensure that the questions of law or fact
common to the class will “predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members” as the litigation progresses.48 This is because materiality
is judged according to an objective standard and therefore can be proved
through evidence common to the class.49 Additionally, a failure of proof on the
common question of materiality after class certification would not result in
individual questions predominating.50 Indeed, a failure of proof would end the
case because materiality is an essential element of a securities-fraud claim.51
Requiring a plaintiff to prove materiality at the certification stage would
therefore “put the cart before the horse” because it would require the plaintiffs
to prove at the class certification stage that “it will win the fray.”52
Thus, by the end of the 2012 Term, it appeared that the Court was solidly
prepared to continue to take it easy on plaintiffs in securities class actions, in
contrast to consumer, employment, antitrust, and other class actions. The
Amgen majority provided a clue as to why. Amgen had contended that “policy
considerations” require that proof of materiality be presented at the class
certification stage.53 Because the class can rely on the fraud-on-the-market
theory without proving materiality, defendants fearing “ruinous liability” face
substantial pressure to settle.54 Amgen thus argued that materiality should be
addressed at the class certification stage because it otherwise may never be
addressed.55 The majority dispensed with this public policy argument by noting
that Congress has played a significant role in the securities class action area.56
First, Congress had taken steps to curb securities-fraud class action abuses by
enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)57 and
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.58 Moreover,

47

133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2013).
Id. at 1195 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1196.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 1191.
53 Id. at 1199.
54 See id. at 1199–1200.
55 Id. at 1200.
56 Id.
57 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 15 and 18 of the
United States Code).
58 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 15 of the United
States Code).
48
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Congress has acknowledged the settlement pressure argument but has rejected
calls to undo the fraud-on-the-market theory.59
Recognizing that a solid majority of the Court would not engage in a
judicial unwinding of securities class action jurisprudence by eviscerating the
Basic presumption, Justice Alito, in a concurrence, as well as Justices Thomas
and Scalia in their dissents, invited defendants to directly challenge Basic
itself.60 This attack came in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II).61 Some commentators thought that this attack could lead to a
squaring of securities class actions with those controlled by Dukes.62 But, in
another 6–3 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court refused to
overrule Basic.63 In addition, the Court rejected the defendant’s fallback
argument that even if Basic survived, the plaintiff ought to be required to prove
“price impact”—that the misrepresentations actually failed to move stock
prices—at the certification stage.64
However, the majority did provide the defendant with an important class
certification procedural tool. The Basic theory allows the plaintiff to allege a
presumption of reliance.65 So, the majority ruled that the defendants may
present evidence seeking to rebut that presumption at the class certification
stage by demonstrating a lack of price impact, which, in turn, would show a
lack of predominance.66 This is an important tool for defendants. For example,
defendants may (and indeed already are) aggressively challenge price impact.67
But, as Justice Ginsburg said in her concurrence, the majority’s approach
“should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable
claims.”68 Of course, a pre-certification battle over price impact will increase
59

See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1200–01.
See id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
62 See Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Takes Halliburton’s Frontal Assault on Securities Class Actions,
FORBES (Nov. 16, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/11/16/supreme-courttakes-halliburtons-frontal-assault-on-securities-class-actions/; Melissa Lipman, Comcast Case Gives Justices a
Chance to Expand on Dukes, LAW360 (June 26, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/
354169?nl_pk=4eb37093-8d7c-47b5-b2f0-0554e4806cd5&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&
utm_campaign=classaction.
63 See Haliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
64 See id. at 2413, 2415.
65 See id. at 2406.
66 See id. at 2417.
67 See Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248,
1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (vacating class certification and remanding for reconsideration in light of Halliburton
II).
68 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
60
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costs and delay settlements, but ironically this battle may increase the price of
settlements when the defendant fails to present sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption. In any event, Halliburton II is good news for the economics
professors who will duke out the price impact issue.
Although Comcast was a relative dud, and the fraud-on-the-market theory
survived Halliburton II, it is unquestionable that Dukes has had a major
impact. Dukes has been cited in 2,002 cases and 1,489 law review articles or
treatises according to Shepard’s.69 However, there has been push back in some
federal courts of appeals. For example, Dukes was cited in the dissent in
twenty-eight cases.70 Famously, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits appear to be
playing a game of ping-pong with the Court in the Front-Loading Washer
Products cases.71 But overall, as Professor Miller said in his keynote speech,
most commentators agree that Dukes has had a far-reaching impact on class
action practice and has undermined class action’s utility as a prosecutorial

69

LEXISNEXIS SHEPARD’S® REPORT: WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES, 131 S. CT. 2541 (2011) (as of
Dec. 14, 2014).
70 See id.
71 See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409, 421 (6th Cir.
2012) (affirming certification of class even though some class members did not experience harm and used the
machines differently), vacated sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013) (vacating the class
certification judgment and remanding on the basis of Comcast). On remand, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed class
certification. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 861 (6th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). The Seventh Circuit litigation followed a similar path. See Butler
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 797–802 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). And,
the Sixth Circuit appears to be challenging the Court yet again in a banking fee case—akin to the
Front-Loading Washer Products case, the Sixth Circuit’s initial opinion was vacated. See Arlington Video
Prods., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bancorp., 515 F. App’x 426 (6th Cir.), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 212 (2013) (vacating the
judgment and remanding in light of Comcast). But on remand, the Sixth Circuit did not command the district
court to reach a different result on the issue of class certification. Arlington Video Prods., Inc. v. Fifth Third
Bancorp, 569 F. App’x 379, 381 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Recognizing that the GVR order does not necessarily imply
that the Supreme Court has in mind a different result in this appeal . . . . We remand the case to the district
court . . . . [T]he district court should undertake the class certification inquiry in accordance with the contract
analysis we outline in this opinion and in light of Supreme Court precedent, including but not limited to,
[Comcast], [Amgen], and [Dukes], and further in light of this court’s class certification cases, particularly those
cases decided after the district court initially denied Arlington’s class certification motion in September 2010.”
(citations omitted)).
Ironically, after the pitched warfare, one of the Whirlpool cases went to trial and the defendant won,
with the jury finding that the washing machines were not defective. Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp. (In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 1:08-wp-65001-CAB, slip op. (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 31, 2014). This is not the end of the story, however, since other cases within the Sixth Circuit, where the
law of other states will be applied, have yet to be tried. See Perry Cooper, Ohio Moldy Washer Verdict Goes to
Whirlpool; Class Will Pursue Claims in Other States, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., Oct. 30, 2014, http://news.
bna.com/clsn/CLSNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=58429124&vname=clasnotallissues&wsn=500078000&sear
chid=23867598&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=CLSNWB&pg=0.
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vehicle for vindicating rights.72 Indeed, of the 2,002 cases in which it was
cited, Dukes was expressly followed in 693 cases. Even the approach the
majority took in Halliburton II is consistent with the Dukes Court’s emphasis
on front-loading significant merits considerations at the class certification
stage.73
C. The Arbitration Cases
The second line of Supreme Court cases involves the availability of class
arbitration as a substitute for class litigation. This is an increasingly important
question as the Court over the years has ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) evinces a strong Congressional preference favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.74
In 2010, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the
Supreme Court held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class
arbitration unless it has consented to do so.75 Here, the plaintiff had brought a
class action against the defendant shipping company for antitrust violations.76
Later, the courts found, and the parties conceded, that the dispute was covered
by an arbitration agreement.77 The plaintiff sought arbitration on behalf of a
class of purchasers.78 The parties agreed to submit the question whether the
arbitration agreement allowed for class arbitration to the arbitration panel that
would be handling the claims.79 The parties also stipulated that the arbitration
clause in their agreement was silent with respect to whether a party could
arbitrate on a class basis.80 The arbitrators were required to follow the Class
Rules developed by the American Arbitration Association.81

72

See Miller, supra note 15.
See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
74 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“To overcome judicial
resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. Section 2
embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all
other contracts . . . .”).
75 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
76 See id. at 667.
77 See id. at 667–68.
78 Id. at 668.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 668–69.
81 Id. at 668.
73
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The panel determined that the arbitration clause allowed class arbitration.82
The district court vacated the award as being in manifest disregard of the law,
but the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the defendant had not cited any
applicable rule against class certification.83 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to it is
inconsistent with the FAA.84
In the wake of Stolt-Nielsen, anti-class arbitration provisions were routinely
added to arbitration agreements. The Court then significantly tightened up the
noose around class arbitration in a case involving such a clause. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, another 5–4 opinion, a cell phone agreement
between consumers and the provider provided for arbitration of all disputes,
but expressly prohibited class arbitration.85 The Ninth Circuit had held the
class arbitration waiver to be unconscionable under otherwise applicable state
law precedent,86 the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Discover Bank v.
Superior Court.87 In Discover Bank, the court found that under California law
a consumer arbitration waiver is unconscionable (1) when small amounts of
damages are involved, (2) when the contract is adhesive in nature, and
(3) when the plaintiff has alleged that the party with the superior bargaining
power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.88
At issue in Concepcion was the extent to which the “saving clause” of § 2
of the FAA could be invoked to argue that the waiver was unenforceable
because “a ground . . . exist[ed] at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”89 The Concepcion majority ruled: “Although § 2’s saving clause
preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”90 In this case, the Court held that
the California Supreme Court’s rule that struck down any consumer class
arbitration waiver frustrated the FAA’s purpose because class arbitration was
at odds with the FAA’s purpose of allowing the parties to design a streamlined
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 669.
Id. at 669–70.
See id. at 684–87.
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
Id. at 1745.
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1110.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1748.
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and efficient process: “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.”91
The dissent argued that California law was not an attempt to attack class
waivers in the consumer context generally but rather simply an application of
state law unconscionability principles.92 Additionally, the dissent pointed out
that in the consumer context as a practical matter, the choice is not between
class arbitration and bilateral arbitration; it is between class arbitration or no
arbitration because the stakes are so small.93
Most commentators agreed that Concepcion would have a major negative
impact on consumer class actions.94 And, as happened after Dukes, most
federal courts fell in line.95 Yet, as discussed below, there was a question
whether state courts historically hostile to arbitration waivers, specifically the
California Supreme Court, the home of Discover Bank,96 would fall in line. In
addition, in the wake of Concepcion, some federal courts held that a class
waiver was unenforceable pursuant to the “effective vindication” exception.97
But in its next important arbitration case, American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant,98 the Supreme Court shot down this exception.
There, a small business brought a class action against American Express for
alleged antitrust violations.99 American Express invoked a clause in its
agreement with Italian Colors requiring individual, and not classwide,
arbitration.100 Italian Colors argued that it would be too costly to pursue its
claim unless it was allowed to pursue it with other small businesses’ claims on

91

Id. at 1751.
See id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93 See id. at 1761.
94 See Paul Karlsgodt, Concepcion a Year Later, Are Consumer Class Actions Dead Yet?,
CLASSACTIONBLAWG.COM (May 10, 2012), http://classactionblawg.com/2012/05/10/concepcion-a-year-laterare-consumer-class-actions-dead-yet/.
95 See, e.g., Andrew Pincus, Arbitration Three Years After Concepcion, LITIG. DAILY (May 13, 2014),
http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202655163488/Guest-Column-Arbitration-Three-Years-After-Concepcion
?slreturn=20140923004108.
96 See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006) (severing as unenforceable a
provision of an arbitration agreement limiting the availability of treble under an antitrust statute).
98 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
99 Id. at 2308.
100 See id.
92
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a class basis.101 Successfully prosecuting an antitrust violation would cost
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars, but the maximum recovery
for Italian Colors’ claim under antitrust law would be limited to about
$39,000.102 The Court, in another 5–4 opinion written by Justice Scalia, ruled
that the FAA required that the arbitration clause be strictly enforced, even if it
meant that the antitrust claims otherwise would not be brought.103 Consistent
with what it did in Concepcion, the Court’s majority enforced the class waiver
clause even though it would likely completely immunize the defendant from
liability for the alleged illegal conduct.104 Indeed, the Court conceded this
result and said that Concepcion “all but resolves this case.”105 Justice Scalia
put it bluntly:
Truth to tell, our decision in AT&T Mobility all but resolves this
case. There we invalidated a law conditioning enforcement of
arbitration on the availability of class procedure because that law
“interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” “[T]he
switch from bilateral to class arbitration,” we said, “sacrifices the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass than final judgment.” We specifically rejected the argument
that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims “that might
otherwise slip through the legal system.”106

In other words, Justice Scalia says, “the fact that it is not worth the expense
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of
the right to pursue that remedy.”107 With the effective vindication doctrine
dead, the question was whether state courts, most prominently California’s,
would fall in line with Concepcion. It appears that they have. In Iskanian v.
CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC,108 the California Supreme Court
overruled its prior authority, Gentry v. Superior Court, (relied on by that Court
in Discover Bank) that allowed California courts to strike down class
arbitration waivers as unconscionable if class arbitration of employment claims
would be a “significantly more effective practical means of vindicating the

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id.
See id. at 2309, 2311.
See id. at 2312.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2311.
327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014).
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rights of the affected employees than individual litigation or arbitration.”109
The Iskanian Court held that Gentry could not stand in the face of Concepcion;
thus, the FAA preempted state rules that disfavored arbitration, including
uniform public policy rationales that otherwise would render class waiver
clauses unconscionable under state law.110
The California Supreme Court, however, did leave open the possibility that
other forms of collective pursuit of claims survive Concepcion and Italian
Colors:
Moreover, the arbitration agreement in the present case, apart from
the class waiver, still permits a broad range of collective activity to
vindicate wage claims. CLS points out that the agreement here is less
restrictive than the one considered in Horton: The arbitration
agreement does not prohibit employees from filing joint claims in
arbitration, does not preclude the arbitrator from consolidating the
claims of multiple employees, and does not prohibit the arbitrator
from awarding relief to a group of employees. The agreement does
not restrict the capacity of employees to “discuss their claims with
one another, pool their resources to hire a lawyer, seek advice and
litigation support from a union, solicit support from other employees,
and file similar or coordinated individual claims.”111

Additionally, the California Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs could
proceed with their claim under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 (PAGA).112 Although the arbitration agreement in
Iskanian covered waiver of “representative actions,” the Court ruled that a
waiver of the right to bring a PAGA claim could not be enforced.113 Under
PAGA, “an aggrieved employee may bring a civil action personally and on
behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor
Code violations.”114 Even though an employee may bring a PAGA action on
behalf of other employees, a PAGA action is not considered to be a class
action but rather an action brought on behalf of the state.115 The Court
characterized PAGA actions as different than class actions because they are not
109

165 P.3d 556, 568 (Cal. 2007).
See Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 135–36.
111 Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 142 (quoting In re D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at
*8 (Jan. 3, 2012), rev’d in part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013)).
112 See Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, ch. 906, 2003 Cal. Stat. 6628 (codified as
amended at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2011)).
113 See Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 149.
114 Id. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 Id. at 147.
110
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purely private prosecutions and are within the state’s police power.116 Thus, the
Court equated PAGA actions with qui tam actions that, according to the Court,
have never been thought to be subject to waiver and are not subject to
preemption under the FAA.117
Obviously, given the ubiquity of consumer class arbitration waivers and
even small business-to-business class arbitration waivers, the combination of
Concepcion, Italian Colors, and the capitulation of the California Supreme
Court in Iskanian means that the arbitral forum generally will be unavailable
for class prosecution. And, of course, Dukes makes it difficult to have a class
action certified in federal court. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court,
and even the California Supreme Court, have made class prosecution of
consumer and other types of claims, especially outside of the securities
context, difficult to achieve. But, as the Front-Loading Washer Products cases
show, there has been some pushback in the courts of appeals that provide
arguments for obtaining class certification.118 And, as discussed above, the
Iskanian Court leaves the door open to other forms of collective action in state
fora and in arbitration. Most importantly for the purpose of this paper, courts of
appeals post-Dukes are certifying settlement classes.119 Before turning to
whether these developments are good or bad for claimants, this Article now
turns to recent settlement class cases to show their continuing viability, in
contrast to the litigation prosecution cases discussed above.
D. Settlement Classes Survive Rigorous Certification Scrutiny
While there is continuing controversy over the fairness of some settlements
under Rule 23(e), and awards of attorneys’ fees under Rule 23(h),120 even
post-Dukes, courts of appeals are approving class certification in the settlement
context even when such classes would not be certified for prosecution
purposes. For example, in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., the Third Circuit
affirmed certification of a settlement class on class objector’s appeal even
though there were variations in applicable state law, which otherwise would
have rendered the class uncertifiable for lack of commonality or predominance

116

See id. at 152–53.
See id. at 148, 151.
118 See supra note 71 for a discussion of the Front-Loading Washer Products cases.
119 See infra Part II.D.
120 See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.). Judge Posner’s opinion sets
forth a guide to what not to do if the parties seek to persuade a court to approve a class settlement.
117
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of common questions.121 The majority ruled that concerns regarding variations
in state law largely dissipate when considering certification of a settlement
class: “The correct outcome is even clearer for certification of a settlement
class because the concern for manageability that is a central tenet in the
certification of a litigation class is removed from the equation.”122 The
majority also dealt with a strong dissent that relied on Dukes:
In this regard, we note the dissent’s misreading of the Supreme
Court’s recent opinion in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes as
supporting its thesis that an inquiry into the existence or validity of
each class member’s claim is required at the class certification stage.
To the contrary, Dukes actually bolsters our position, making clear
that the focus is on whether the defendant’s conduct was common as
to all of the class members, not on whether each plaintiff has a
“colorable” claim. In Dukes, the Court held that commonality and
predominance are defeated when it cannot be said that there was a
common course of conduct in which the defendant engaged with
respect to each individual. But commonality is satisfied where
common questions generate common answers “apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.” That is exactly what is presented here,
for the answers to questions about De Beers’s alleged misconduct and
the harm it caused would be common as to all of the class members,
and would thus inform the resolution of the litigation if it were not
being settled.123

Moreover, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that all class members
must state a valid claim as a prerequisite to class certification.124 Sullivan was
brought as a nationwide class action alleging state and federal antitrust, unfair
competition, and other claims.125 Under the law of some states, as under
federal antitrust law, indirect purchasers lack standing to pursue antitrust
claims.126 The settlement, however, provided for indirect as well as direct
purchasers.127 The Third Circuit parried this thrust by noting that the question
upon class certification “is not what valid claims can plaintiffs assert; rather, it
is simply whether common issues of fact or law predominate.”128 There is no
“‘claims’ or ‘merits’ litmus test” that must be imported into the predominance
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

667 F.3d 273, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 299–300 (citing and quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 286.
See id. at 304–05.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 305.
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inquiry except when “necessary to determine preliminarily whether certain
elements will necessitate individual or common proof.”129 Such inquiry is
otherwise not appropriate under Rule 23; rather, “the legal viability of asserted
claims is properly considered through a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) or
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.”130
The Second Circuit relied in part on the Third Circuit’s Sullivan approach
in In re American International Group, Inc. Securities Litigation (AIG).131
There, the court emphasized the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,132 and essentially paid only lip service to
Dukes.133 In Amchem, the United States Supreme Court decertified a settlement
class.134 However, the Court recognized that the use of settlement classes had
become routine in class action practice and held that settlement is a relevant
consideration when determining whether to certify a class. It noted that a
district court “[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only class
certification . . . need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems, . . . for the proposal is that there be no
trial.”135
Quoting Amchem, the AIG court found that a class’s identity as a settlement
class is relevant to the class certification question.136 Further, the court in AIG
found that the plaintiffs’ inability to use the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, thus
triggering the need to prove reliance on an individual basis, did not raise a
predominance problem in the settlement context; as the court put it, “In the
context of a settlement class, concerns about whether individual issues would
create ‘intractable management problems’ at trial drop out of the predominance
analysis because ‘the proposal is that there be no trial.’”137 However, as both
the Amchem Court and the Third Circuit in Sullivan warned, the AIG court
made clear that the district court “must still determine whether the ‘the legal or
factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine
controversy’ are sufficiently similar as to yield a cohesive class,” and must

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
689 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2012).
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
See AIG, 689 F.3d at 237–38.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 611–12.
Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
See AIG, 689 F.3d at 238–39.
Id. at 240 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620).
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protect the interests of the class.138 And the focus of the district court should be
“on ‘questions that preexist any settlement,’ and not on whether all class
members have ‘a common interest in a fair compromise’ of their claims.”139
Moreover, the AIG court wholeheartedly endorsed what Judge Scirica
stated in his concurrence in Sullivan:
[S]ome inquiries essential to litigation class certification are no
longer problematic in the settlement context. A key question in a
litigation class action is manageability—how the case will or can be
tried, and whether there are questions of fact or law that are capable
of common proof. But the settlement class presents no management
problems because the case will not be tried. Conversely, other
inquiries assume heightened importance and heightened scrutiny
because of the danger of conflicts of interest, collusion, and unfair
allocation.140

Thus, the Second Circuit noted in AIG that the predominance requirement may
be easier to satisfy in the settlement context, but that other Rule 23
requirements aimed at protecting class members, “such as the Rule 23(a)(4)
requirement of adequate representation, will ‘demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention.’”141
Most recently, apart from Rule 23’s certification requirements, the Fifth
Circuit ruled in the BP oil spill litigation that Article III does not prevent
certification of a settlement class that includes members who may not have
suffered injury.142 With respect to Rule 23’s certification requirements, the
Fifth Circuit was equally supportive of the certification of a settlement class.143
Addressing the objectors’ argument that Dukes’s analysis of commonality
dictated reversal of the class settlement certification, the court rejected the idea
that class members had to suffer the “same injury.”144 Rather, the court found
that Dukes specified that the “same injury” requirement could be met by an
instance of a defendant’s injurious conduct—here, the conduct related to the
oil spill.145 Thus, the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) was met.146
138

Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623).
Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623).
140 Id. at 239 (alterations in original) (quoting Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Scirica, J., concurring)).
141 Id. at 240 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620).
142 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 821 (5th Cir. 2014).
143 See id.
144 See id. at 810–11.
145 See id.
139
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Moving on to the adequacy of representation prong of Rule 23, which
assumes even greater importance after Amchem, the court in In re Deepwater
Horizon considered the argument of some objectors to the settlement that class
members from Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi should
have been divided into their own subclasses and that some class members
would have been “better off under the GCCF claims process” established by
BP to compensate victims of the oil spill.147
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the creation of subclasses is sometimes
necessary under Rule 23(a)(4) to avoid an intra-class conflict, but it ruled that
there is no need to create subclasses to accommodate every instance of
difference.148 Here, “because the class members’ claims [arose] under federal
law rather than state law, [the court was] not persuaded that there [was] any
fundamental conflict between the ‘differently weighted interests’ of class
members from different geographical regions.”149 Indeed, geographical criteria
were incorporated into the Settlement Agreement, which provided that
“causation becomes more difficult” for a claimant to show “the further one
moves from the coast.”150 Thus, “the differences between the formulas
applicable in the different geographic zones were ‘rationally related to the
relative strengths and merits of similarly situated claims.’”151
The Fifth Circuit dealt with Comcast by essentially adopting Justice
Ginsburg’s Comcast dissent. Damages, according to the court, need not be
susceptible to a formula for classwide purposes, and the fact that class
members’ damages need to be determined on an individual basis does not
doom a settlement class.152
II. ET TU, CLASS SETTLEMENT?
The analysis above shows that although the United States Supreme Court
has tightened the noose around class certification approval of litigation
prosecution class actions during the last few Terms, one of its older opinions,
Amchem, ironically one in which a class settlement was vacated, has been cited
146

See id. at 811.
See id. at 813–14.
148 Id. at 813.
149 Id. at 813–14.
150 Id. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 Id. (quoting In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 917–18 (E.D. La. 2012)).
152 See id. at 815–17.
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to support certification of settlement classes in cases that probably would not
have been certified as litigation classes otherwise. The defendants’ nightmare
about having to confront a litigation class thus has abated, yet the ability of
defendants to obtain a global peace through a class settlement seems quite
alive and well. Of course, as mentioned above, the settlement must pass muster
under Rules 23(e) and (h), in terms of fairness and attorneys’ fees. And courts
must remain mindful of adequacy of representation requirements under
Rule 23(a)(4) to ensure that class members’ interests are adequately
represented. But class certification requirements such as commonality and
typicality under Rule 23(a) and predominance and manageability under
Rule 23(b) for damages class actions appear to be somewhat relaxed when the
parties seek approval of a deal struck between class counsel and the
defendants. Therefore, it is time to turn to the question whether class
settlements bargained for under this regime are good or bad for class members.
In addition, the question whether class settlements are good or bad for
defendants ought to be analyzed as well.
The charge to our Panel assumes that global settlements are always good
for defendants and never good for class members.153 This is a rather debatable
assumption. First of all, defendants may not be obtaining the lasting peace that
they thought they had bargained for because, although the power of the
preclusive effect of an approved class settlement remains strong, there are
chinks in the preclusion armor.154 Below, this Article will address the
Stephenson case, which demonstrates that global settlements may not always
provide the peace that defendants seem to think they will.155
Second, although the discussion above shows that settlement classes are
somewhat immune from Dukes’s strict approach to class certification,
undeniable abuses exist in class settlement practice. Judge Posner’s recent
description of a parade of horribles in Eubank v. Pella Corp. is illustrative.156

153

See supra text accompanying note 12.
See infra Part III.A.
155 See infra Part III.B.
156 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014). Among other things, Judge Posner suggested that the class counsel and
class representative should not be related, quick pay provisions for class counsel should be avoided, any
reduction in attorneys’ fees reverting to the defendant is “questionable,” approval orders must show that court
carefully scrutinized that the class counsel acted as fiduciaries for the entire class, courts should be wary of
approving settlements before deadline for filing claims, courts should be wary of approving settlements that do
not quantify benefits to the class, “ethical embroilment” of class counsel is reason to remove counsel because
potential financial difficulties could create a conflict of interest with the class, claims forms should be short
and easy to fill out, and class notice should be clear and brief. See id.
154
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At the settlement stage, class interests are no longer necessarily aligned with
those of its counsel. Rather, the interest of class counsel in obtaining the
biggest bang for its buck is more aligned with the interests of the defendant in
obtaining peace at the lowest possible price. Knowing that courts are likely to
rule that a settlement class is certifiable under the more relaxed standards for
commonality, predominance, manageability, etc., means that the problem of
how to protect class members not only appears front and center but also bears
directly on the Panel’s focus on whether class settlements are ultimately good
or bad for class members.
A. The Preclusion Problem
In another article, I traced the history of class actions from 1199 to the
present to show that the essence of the controversy about class actions is the
power of preclusion.157 Defendants have little to fear if an individual plaintiff
sues on a $30 claim.158 And, as Judge Posner once put it: “The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”159
Aggregating thousands or millions of $30 claims, on the other hand,
presents defendants with a real problem. If the plaintiff class wins, because of
the power of preclusion, all class members will be entitled to their $30.160 This
puts pressure on the defendants to settle for less than $30 per claim multiplied
by the number of class members to avoid a “betting the company” scenario.161
But, the defendant also may gain by settling, because the same preclusion
principles would in turn bind the class members, and the defendant gains
global peace.
The history of class actions shows a deep ambivalence over the degree of
preclusive effect of class actions. Professor Hazard describes eighteenth and
early nineteenth century English and American decisions that “oscillated
between saying that absent members of a class were bound by a decree and
157

See Vairo, supra note 1, at 723–24.
See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). Of course, it is highly
unlikely that someone would sue for $30 because the cost of doing so would be prohibitive.
159 Id. (second emphasis added); see also Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter. Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 674, 677–78
(7th Cir. 2013) (explaining how class actions are needed for small-value claims).
160 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884–85 (2008) (noting the class action judgments’ exception to
the general rule that only parties or their privies are bound); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)
(assuming a class member is adequately represented, the class member is bound by a class action judgment).
161 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
158
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that they were not.”162 He recognized that “[t]he same pattern of equivocation
persisted over the next century and into the modern era.”163 This pattern is due
to the “curious paradox” created, on the one hand, by the confluence of the
Necessary and Indispensable Party rules, which originated in the Chancery
courts and are now essentially codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19,
and, on the other hand, the Representative Party rule, which also originated in
the Chancery courts and is now essentially codified in Rule 23.164 As Professor
Hazard put it:
The Indispensable Party Rule stated that when the absentees were
few in number the action could not proceed without them, lest they
be bound by the decree, while the Representative Suit Rule stated that
if the absentees were numerous, the action could proceed without
them because they would be bound.165

Thus, the “curious paradox.” But, as another early Chancery case
illustrates, the curious paradox arose because of an important need. Chancey v.
May166 detailed London’s stock market crash of 1718, which led to lawsuits
that resemble today’s damage class action.167 The defendants objected to the
representative form of the action.168 In a brief, two-paragraph opinion, the
chancellor dispatched the defendants’ objection while setting the table for the
continuing class action debate:
[First], [b]ecause it was in behalf of themselves, and all others the
proprietors of the same undertaking, except the defendants, and so all
the rest were in effect parties.
[Second], [b]ecause it would be impracticable to make them all
parties by name, and there would be continual abatements by death
162 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect
of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (1998) (“This essay is a history of the doctrine of res judicata in
class suits. It reveals that the condition of precedent on this issue was from the beginning equivocal and
confused, and that it remains somewhat so today.”).
163 Id.
164 See id. at 1861 n.50.
165 Id. In support of this proposition, Professor Hazard compared the Court’s decision in Shields v.
Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854), where the Court refused “to uphold the rescission of a contract where
four of the six parties in the contract were not within the jurisdiction of the lower court,” with the Court’s
decision in Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), where the Court stated “[f]or convenience,
therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to
represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.” Id. (citing
Shields, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 141 and Smith, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 302).
166 (1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (Ch.); Prec. Ch. 592.
167 Vairo, supra note 1, at 728.
168 Chancey, 24 Eng. Rep. at 265.
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and otherwise, and no coming at justice, if all were to be made
parties.169

Here, the Chancery Court picks up on the ideas of efficiency—the need to
bind all concerned—with the idea of justice. Without a representative form of
action, there could be “no coming at justice.”170 For present purposes, this
describes the state of so-called negative-value class actions where there would
be no vindication of rights because the cost of suit would be prohibitive—
“only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”171
Moving briskly on to the present, the curious paradox perplexed the first
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee. “Professor James
Moore, Rule 23’s chief draftsman and member of the original Advisory
Committee, knew there was a continuing need for a class action device because
of the ‘too numerous’ to join problem.”172 But, he was concerned about the
confused state of the case law on the binding effect of class judgments.173
Professor Moore borrowed Justice Story’s schema for the three types of class
actions he crafted in the original Rule 23.174
Moore’s third category of class actions, which continues to this day in the
form of a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action, is the most controversial. These
are the cases involving several rights or common questions in cases in which
there is a lack of “privity” which otherwise might justify preclusive effect
under general preclusion rules.175 The problem for Professor Moore in this sort
of case is the question whether class members in such cases should be bound
by the class judgment.176 It was generally understood in the other categories
that class members would be bound because of their indivisible interests in the
subject matter of the suit, but especially when several rights were in issue—
where the class members sought their own individual recovery—preclusion

169

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
171 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
172 Vairo, supra note 1, at 736.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 737; see also Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 162, at 1881.
175 Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 162, at 1880–90; see Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008)
(explaining the class action judgments exception to the general rule that only parties or their privies are
bound).
176 See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L.
REV. 323, 329–30 (2005) (noting that, although one of the purposes of establishing class categories was to
“clarify the binding effect of a judgment in a class action,” the committee declined to do so for fear of
imposing on substantive rights outside its jurisdiction).
170
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was problematic.177 Therefore, “[c]orrectly labeling an action under one of
Professor Moore’s three new categories would become important, because its
categorization could determine the judgment’s binding effect on absent class
members.”178
Professor Moore wanted preclusion to be covered in some way in the Rule
or Advisory Committee Note.179 But, the Advisory Committee rejected
Professor Moore’s proposal to deal with preclusion “due to the feeling that
such a matter was one of substance and not one of procedure.”180 After failing
to persuade the Advisory Committee that a class action judgment’s binding
effect should be addressed in the rule or Advisory Committee Note, Moore
described what the effects of a judgment should be.181 He wrote in his
treatise182 describing the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a
judgment in a “true” class action was conclusive on the class, that a judgment
in a “hybrid” class action was conclusive on persons having claims affecting
specific property, but that a judgment in a “spurious” class action involving

177 See Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 162, at 1881–82 (“[Story’s] analytical system consists of
categories that overlap, or, in terminology now fashionable, are ‘overinclusive.’ . . . [C]ases involving
‘associations’ (his second category) also involve questions of ‘common or general interest’ (his first category),
and typically involve ‘parties too numerous’ to be joined (his third category). Questions of ‘common or
general interest’ (his first category) often involve ‘parties too numerous’ (his third category). Furthermore,
‘parties too numerous’ can be distinguished from mankind at large only by reference to some kind of interest
or question that is ‘common or general’ to them but not to others. In any event, Story clearly did not assert
that, within his system of classification, the type of suit determined the res judicata effects of the judgment.
The best he could make of the precedents was that judgments involving members of associations were
sometimes binding on absentees, and that the same was true of creditors’ bills and bills of peace.”).
178 Vairo, supra note 1, at 727.
179 See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary
Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570–76 (1937).
180 James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions—Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. REV. 555, 556 (1938). For further discussion of this problem, see Edward J. Ross, Rule 23(b) Class
Actions—A Matter of “Practice and Procedure” or “Substantive Right”?, 27 EMORY L.J. 247, 251–52, 256–
61 (1978) (discussing how, because of Rule 23’s binding effect on class members, it is not merely a rule of
procedure permitted by the Rules Enabling Act, but it “drastically affects a substantive right” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Donald W. Fyr, On Classifying Class Suits: A Reply to Mr. Ross, 27 EMORY L.J.
267, 270–71 (1978) (arguing classification of suits may influence the outcome of a case, but that it is
incidental to the Rule’s application and does not equate with the violation of a substantive right).
181 See 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.60 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the
considerations and practical steps counsel and plaintiffs may take before filing a class action); see also
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 251 (1950) (“So great is the deserved respect for his
treatise, that his scheme about binding outsiders has had almost as much influence upon judges as if it had
been embodied in Rule 23.”).
182 See Vairo, supra note 1, at 739 & n.80.
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common questions was conclusive only on parties and privies to the
proceedings.183
Most courts followed Moore’s guidelines,184 but not all of them.185 For
example, in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisely, the court allowed
“one-way intervention,” which was particularly troubling to defendants who
lost.186 While class members would not be bound if the defendant won,
decisions such as Union Carbide made it possible for potential plaintiffs to sit
back and wait.187 If the plaintiff class won, they would then be allowed to
intervene rather than have to sue again on their own.188
This led the Advisory Committee to get back to work on Rule 23 in the
1960’s, prompting an epic battle between John P. Frank, who would constrict
the growing use of class actions, and Benjamin Kaplan, who believed that they
were becoming an ever more important tool for vindicating individual rights.189
Frank opposed class treatment, especially in mass tort cases for two key
reasons that resonate to this day.190 First, he argued that individual class
members should have the right to bring their own cases.191 Second, anticipating
an Amchem192 situation, where class counsel and the defendant agree to a
settlement at the expense of absent class members, Frank worried that
plaintiffs’ counsel might sell out the class members.193 This concern was
particularly important in cases in which the absent class members may have
large personal injury claims because such claimants would have both the

183

See Rabiej, supra note 176, at 330–31.
See id. at 331.
185 See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisely, 300 F.2d 561, 588 n.13 (10th Cir. 1961) (noting
that Moore’s argument was not accepted by the original Rules Committee and implying the rejection was the
basis for Moore’s reasoning in his treatise).
186 See id. at 589 (“[O]ne is not precluded from claiming the benefits of a favorable judgment to which he
was not a named party, simply because he would not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment rendered
against named parties who did not adequately represent his interests.”).
187 See Rabiej, supra note 176, at 332–33.
188 See id.
189 Vairo, supra note 1, at 740–42.
190 Rabiej, supra note 176, at 335.
191 Id. (“[Frank] championed the principle that each person has a right to litigate his or her own
case . . . .”).
192 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–21 (1997) (discussing the “role settlement
may play . . . in determining the propriety of class certification”); Rabiej, supra note 176, at 335 (“In [Frank’s]
view, defendant companies would ‘sell’ a settlement to the lowest bidder willing to settle a class action.”); see
also infra Part III.A.3 for further discussion of Amchem.
193 See Rabiej, supra note 176, at 335 (“Unscrupulous lawyers would barter away absent class members’
rights in exchange for substantial attorney[s’] fees . . . .”).
184
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incentive and the ability to sue individually.194 Accordingly, Frank believed
that Rule 23(b)(3), the provision Kaplan would concede allowed for the “most
adventuresome” type of class action, ought to be reined in, if not eliminated,
but certainly not expanded.195
Kaplan opposed Frank’s recommendation to delete (b)(3) class actions.196
“The law is already headed in this direction, and there is excellent reason for
encouraging this growth under proper safeguards.”197 Responding to Frank’s
contention regarding the individual’s right to litigate, Kaplan pointed out that
class actions are often the only way for indigent clients to hire an attorney.198
Finally, Kaplan responded to Frank’s fear of attorney misconduct in damages
class actions by insisting that providing notice to class members would serve
as an adequate safeguard because disaffected class members can opt out.199
This exchange is at the heart of the charge for our panel. Does the current
Rule 23 regime do a good enough job of protecting class members in general
or future claimants? Do opt-out rights do the work that Kaplan hoped they
would? Is the rise of objectors the answer? On the one hand, as Judge Posner
pointed out in Pella, objectors do a great job of smelling out a rat.200 On the
other hand, as Judge Colleen McMahon admonished, objectors may be even
less altruistic than the plaintiff’s lawyers who brought the class action.201
But before addressing whether class settlements are good or bad for
plaintiffs, the Article will turn first to whether class settlements are always
good for defendants. Do they get the peace they think they bought? As the next
part shows, probably yes. But there are risks. The courts are not immune to due
process arguments when they have the effect of denying injured parties who
were not adequately represented their rights. Second, with respect to class
members, assuming there are systemic problems with class action practice that
194

See Vairo, supra note 1, at 741.
See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
196 See Rabiej, supra note 176, at 335–36.
197 Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to Chairman and Members of Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Additional Points on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of March 15,
1963, at 5 (Sept. 12, 1963).
198 See Rabiej, supra note 176, at 335–36.
199 See id. at 335.
200 Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“Enter the objectors. Members
of the class who smell a rat can object to approval of the settlement.”).
201 See City of Providence v. Aeropostale, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7132(CM)(GWG), 2014 WL 1883494, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014) (providing a textbook example of how to obtain settlement approval); id. at *3
(featuring a judge not happy with an objector).
195
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may make it unlikely that class members are protected as well as they should
be, the Article will ask: what are the alternatives?
B. Have Defendants Really Bought Peace?
The Amchem decision implicated the preclusion problem discussed above
that has dominated the debate over class actions. There, the Court refused to
approve a class settlement largely because it believed class members could not
be bound because they were not adequately represented.202 Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s vision of the contours of due process in mass claims litigation, including
the components of proper notice, appears to be evolving with a greater emphasis
on the rights of claimants. For example, Justice Ginsberg, the author of the
majority opinion in Amchem, suggests that it may not be possible to provide
sufficient notice to unknown and future claimants.203
It also must be recalled that a key reason why the Supreme Court vacated the
class action settlement in Amchem was because of its suspicions that class
counsel and the defendants had become a bit too cozy. In some respects, the
Amchem defendants were lucky—the question of whether the class would be
certified and the settlement approved was decided on appeal. Thus, the
defendants knew they would not get the global peace for which they had
bargained. But what if the settlement had been approved, and future claimants
collaterally attacked the settlement on the ground that they were not adequately
represented by class counsel?
An important, but relatively ignored, case suggests that a “caveat emptor”
sticker ought to be placed on a class settlement, even after it has gone through
the appellate process. In Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., plaintiffs filed claims
against Dow Chemical and other chemical manufacturers alleging that they had
been exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War but that their injuries did
not manifest themselves until after the $180 million fund, established in 1984
through a class action settlement in the Agent Orange case, had been depleted.204
202 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (disapproving of class certification
because class members did not possess similar injuries or have similarly aligned interests); see also, e.g.,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1940) (noting that selection of representatives whose substantial
interests do not align with those they are deemed to represent does not give absent parties the due process to
which they are entitled).
203 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 (“[W]e recognize the gravity of the question whether class action notice
sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and
amorphous.”).
204 273 F.3d 249, 252, 255 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Plaintiff Stephenson served in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970, both on the ground
and as a helicopter pilot.205 He claimed that he was in regular contact with
Agent Orange during the War, and on February 19, 1998, he was diagnosed
with multiple myeloma, a bone marrow cancer.206 Plaintiff Isaacson served in
Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 as a crew chief in the Air Force and worked at a
base for airplanes that sprayed various herbicides, including Agent Orange,
and in 1996 Isaacson was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma.207 Dow
Chemical and the other defendants produced and sold the herbicide Agent
Orange and similar agents to the United States Government during the
Vietnam War.208
Stephenson filed his suit in the Western District of Louisiana in February
1999.209 Isaacson filed suit in New Jersey state court in August 1998.210
Defendants removed the Isaacson case to federal court, and Isaacson’s
subsequent motion to remand was denied by the New Jersey federal district
court.211 Thereafter, both cases were transferred to the Eastern District of New
York by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel and consolidated before Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, who had approved the Agent Orange settlement in 1984.212
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the 1984 class
action settlement and subsequent final judgment.213 Judge Weinstein granted
the motion, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the class action settlement could
not bind them, as a class action settlement ordinarily would, because they had been
denied due process due to inadequate representation.214 Thus, concluded Judge
Weinstein, the plaintiffs’ suits were “an impermissible collateral attack on the
prior settlement.”215 The Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs’ position,
however, and reversed on the issue of adequacy of representation.216 In order to
understand the importance of the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephenson, it is
important to review some of the history of the Agent Orange settlement.
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 256, 261.
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The Agent Orange settlement class consisted of veterans (and their spouses,
parents, or children) who “at any time from 1961 to 1972 . . . were injured while in
or near Vietnam by exposure to” Agent Orange or other specified similar
substances.217 Payments were to be made for ten years, ending in December 31,
1994.218 In 1987, the Second Circuit approved the settlement and much of the
distribution plan, rejecting claims that the class had not been adequately
represented and that notice was not proper.219 A few years later, two class actions
were filed in Texas state courts on behalf of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent
Orange against the same defendants in the settled suit.220 The plaintiffs alleged that
they were not bound by the Agent Orange settlement because their injuries did not
manifest themselves until after the settlement.221 The cases were removed to
federal court and were transferred to Judge Weinstein’s court by the MDL
Panel.222 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the cases, rejecting the
plaintiffs’ argument that they were not “injured” for the purposes of Agent Orange
class membership because their claims had not manifested until after the settlement
date.223 Rather, the Second Circuit ruled that because they were exposed to Agent
Orange prior to the settlement date, they were “injured” for the purpose of class
membership.224 Further, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ due process
arguments, ruling that actual notice was not a constitutional requirement and that
they were adequately represented, even though there was no separate
representative for future claimants, because the settlement was structured to
provide for such claimants.225
One would have thought that the Second Circuit would have used similar
reasoning to reject the due process objections of Stephenson and Isaacson.
However, it did not. Here, the Second Circuit agreed with the defendants that a
collateral attack on a class action judgment is impermissible if the due process
rights of the class members have been determined in prior litigation.226 And, it also
agreed with the defendants that the Second Circuit had decided in its 1993 decision
that there had been “adequate representation of all class members in the original

217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151, 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1987).
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1434.
Id.
Id. at 1435.
See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Agent Orange settlement.”227 Splitting a significant hair, however, the Second
Circuit then noted that “neither this Court nor the district court has addressed
specifically the adequacy of representation for those members of the class whose
injuries manifested after depletion of the settlement funds.”228
Quoting Hansberry v. Lee, the Second Circuit stated, “[C]lass action judgments
can only bind absent class members where ‘the interests of those not joined are of
the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the
latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation.’”229
Accordingly, the court held that the collateral attack vehicle was available to
contest the validity of the res judicata effect of the Agent Orange settlement and to
test whether, in fact, the interests of those class members whose claims manifested
after the depletion of the fund were considered and protected.230
In other words, the court accepted the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs
were members of the Agent Orange class but rejected their contention that the
plaintiffs could not collaterally attack the judgment. The plaintiffs relied on the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem231 and Ortiz232 to make the argument that
they were not parties bound by the original settlement.233 In Stephenson, the
Second Circuit held that none of the parties to the original Agent Orange
settlement adequately represented the interests of those who had been exposed to
allegedly harmful agents but whose injuries would not manifest themselves until
after the termination of the trust, ten years down the line.234
One way of fixing the Stephenson problem would be to structure all deals to
provide for an “evergreen fund,” such as those used to resolve cases under
§ 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.235 This would help ensure that a settlement fund
would not run out of money before all eligible claimants were compensated. For
example, the National Gypsum plan of reorganization specifically left open the
possibility of allowing future claimants to file suit if the settlement trust set up

227

Id. at 257.
Id. at 257–58 (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 258 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940)).
230 See id. at 257–58.
231 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
232 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
233 See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 259.
234 Id. at 261.
235 To obtain a discharge of debts, a corporation seeking reorganization as a result of its asbestos liability
is required to make current and future contributions to a trust set to compensate asbestos claimants.
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2012).
228
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by the plan ran out of funds.236 Additionally, in a significant case rejecting a
bankruptcy plan of reorganization under § 524(g), the Third Circuit reminded
us that due process extends to bankruptcy proceedings.237 Thus, it is important
to grapple with what minimal due process means and try to predict what the
Supreme Court is likely to do in future cases. Our first clue that there is an
important battle over the meaning of due process appears in the Stephenson
litigation itself. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an unsigned per
curiam, 4–4 opinion (Justice Stevens did not participate), affirmed the Second
Circuit’s opinion, which allowed the claims of the plaintiffs to proceed.238
There are two further problems: (1) the Second Circuit, borrowing from the
Amchem and Ortiz decisions, questioned whether future claimants can ever be
adequately represented;239 and (2) the Second Circuit, again relying on Amchem,
stated that it may well be impossible to provide adequate notice to exposure-only
plaintiffs.240 The use of subclasses may be a way of trying to deal with internal
class conflicts to prevent inadequate representation problems. But, how is it
possible for the parties to settlement discussions today to anticipate, and then
provide separate representation to, a sufficient number of subclasses to ensure that
the interests of all class members are protected? Take a product like Zyprexa241 or
even the more recent NFL concussion case.242 Unless a class is defined very
carefully to avoid future claims that may go uncompensated, a class settlement
may be subject to a collateral attack. This is contrary to what defendants tend to
want. In seeking global peace, defendants will tend to want a more inclusive class,
but that could invite future claimants to collaterally attack the class settlement if
the settlement fund runs out of assets.
The practical problem that confronts parties using a class settlement to put
litigation involving a product or service behind them is to determine and consider
the possible interests of any potential claimant. First, Stephenson allows a collateral
attack where one might have thought there would have been a rubber stamping of
236 In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 219 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming plan channeling claims to
settlement vehicle and enjoining suits against successor entity only if settlement vehicle retained sufficient
funds to pay all claims).
237 See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 245 & n.64 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Jones v.
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that minimal due process rights extend to
bankruptcy proceedings); Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
238 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam).
239 See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 & n.9.
240 See id. at 260, 261 n.8.
241 See supra note 13.
242 In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (granting preliminary
approval of class settlement because NFL agreed to remove cap on its obligation to pay future claims).
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the original judgment.243 Second, the settling parties, most significantly parties
who may end up the target of future litigation, will then have the burden of
demonstrating that the interests of all class members were adequately represented.
As Stephenson demonstrated, drawing that line is very difficult. While as a matter
of due process, perhaps the Second Circuit may have been correct to open the door
to the collateral attack, the determination on the merits on a question of adequacy
of representation will be quite tricky, and the court’s resolution of the issue years
or decades after the original settlement appears to be more of an exercise of
Monday-morning quarterbacking.
There are, however, two caveats to this alarming caveat alluded to above. First,
Stephenson involved a scenario where the settlement fund was exhausted before
the class members’ claims arose.244 Accordingly, parties to a settlement may want
to agree to mechanisms for funding a settlement claims facility that will prevent
exhaustion of the fund.245 Moreover, it may well be that the problem, in terms of
numbers of non-bound class members, will not be significant in many cases. For
example, when Stephenson’s companion case was remanded, the district court
judge dismissed the case on the merits.246 Nonetheless, defendants must consider
the implications of Stephenson. Ironically, and this provides a nice segue to the
next section, settlements that would pass muster under Stephenson will, by
definition, provide a better level of justice for class members, those known and
those unknown. Class definitions will be tighter, and adequate funding assured.
C. Are Alternatives to Class Actions Better for Plaintiffs?
The previous section shows that class action settlements will not always be
good for defendants. This section assumes, as the Panel’s charge does, and as
discussed above, that class settlements can be bad for class members.247
Moreover, as discussed below with respect to the growing use of cy pres
remedies,248 it is undeniable that class members usually are not fully
compensated through class action settlements. But the question is whether this
means that, as John Frank argued, damages class actions ought to be
eliminated. And, if so, what are the alternatives?

243

See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 259.
See id. at 258.
245 See, e.g., In re NFL Players’, 301 F.R.D. at 198, 201 (granting preliminary approval of class
settlement because NFL agreed to remove cap on its obligation to pay future claims).
246 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d 873, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
247 See discussion supra notes 12, 153.
248 See infra notes 265–70, discussing cy pres doctrine.
244
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This section argues that we ought not throw the baby out with the bath
water. Class settlements may have their problems, but in some cases, they may
be the only, or most effective, way to vindicate claims or at least the essence of
the rights underlying the class claims. Therefore, courts ought to continue to
relax certification standards with respect to commonality, typicality, and
predominance of common questions but, to protect class members, ought to
rigorously enforce adequacy of representation requirements and scrutinize the
fairness and reasonableness of class settlements and attorneys’ fees. In other
cases, however, alternatives to class settlements should be considered.
1. Distinguishing Between High- and Low-Value Claims
First, it may well be that John Frank was right, at least in some cases. As
discussed above, Frank opposed damage class actions, especially in mass tort
cases.249 He was a champion of “individual autonomy,”250 meaning that he
believed that class treatment deprived individuals of the right to bring and
prosecute their own cases.251 Second, anticipating an Amchem situation,252 and
the topic of our panel, he worried that plaintiffs’ counsel, in a rush to collect
fees, might sell out the class members to a defendant wanting to get a matter
behind it.253
Although I have argued in the past that mass resolution of personal injury
claims can result in efficiency and fairness,254 I have recanted a bit.255 First, it
is this type of case—where plaintiffs have allegedly suffered personal
injuries—in which Benjamin Kaplan’s protections—notice and the right to opt
out—would appear to be the most helpful.256 Second, as the experience of the
asbestos litigation ultimately shows, disaggregation—and not aggregation via
class action settlements—may be the key to resolving large numbers of
personal injury claims, or other high-value claims, involving the same
substance or product.

249

See discussion supra notes 189–95.
See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass
Torts Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 81–83 (1997).
251 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 250; Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992).
255 See Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by the Reporter: Is Disaggregation the Answer to the Asbestos
Mess?, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1039, 1066–68 (2014).
256 See discussion supra notes 196–99.
250
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Judge Eduardo Robreno, who presides over the federal asbestos
multidistrict litigation, MDL 875, and Judge Mark Davidson, who presides
over the Texas state courts asbestos litigation, both testified at the hearings of
the ABA TIPS Task Force on Asbestos Litigation hearings in Los Angeles in
October 2013.257 Both judges expressed the strong view that disaggregation
was the key to dealing with the huge caseloads that they both had initially
confronted:
The testimony of Judge Robreno and Judge Davidson shows that
letting traditional tort law and lawyers do their jobs, with the help of
an administrative infrastructure that moves cases to trial readiness,
has been more effective in resolving asbestos cases than efforts at
global or mass settlements have been. Of course, most cases do, or
are likely, to settle. But when settlement bargaining takes place in the
real shadow of the law and thus the parties must assess the range of
possible outcomes at a trial based on a complete discovery record,
there is less likelihood that a particular plaintiff will be
undercompensated as happens in aggregated settlements or that the
defendants will be overpaying.258

Judge Robreno’s testimony also suggested that attempts at aggregated
resolution of the asbestos litigation were all failures, except for the MDL
itself.259 In his view, the disaggregation of asbestos claims to prepare them for
individual trial purposes, after the MDL discovery process is completed,
allowed asbestos cases to be tried or settled more expeditiously than attempts
at group settlements.260
After Amchem, it has been rare for a personal injury mass tort case to be
certified. And, the Frank view generally ought to be extended to all high-value
claims because the incentive to pursue a case individually is just as strong.
Likewise, courts have a tool that enables them to justify refusing to certify
class actions in which the class members have high-value claims: Rule
23(b)(3)(A) itself states that one criterion for deciding whether to certify a
damages class is “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions.”261

257
258
259
260
261

Vairo, supra note 254, at 1056.
Id. at 1068 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1069.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
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In low- or negative-value situations, on the other hand, notice and the
opportunity to opt out are of little value—who would opt out of a $30 per class
member class? As Judge Richard Posner wrote in Carnegie v. Household
International, Inc.:
The more claimants there are, the more likely a class action is to yield
substantial economies in litigation. It would hardly be an
improvement to have in lieu of this single class action 17 million
suits each seeking damages of $15 to $30 . . . . The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.262

In other words, these cases would not be prosecuted without the class action
device. So, the debate really ought not be about whether the class members are
being treated unfairly; rather it ought to be about whether class actions are the
best of a number of possibly worse alternatives.
However, the assertion that class actions may be the lesser of other evils
has become increasingly controversial. It is axiomatic that a key purpose of the
Rule 23(b)(3) class action was to allow large numbers of claimants to
aggregate their claims so that a lawyer would have an incentive to prosecute
those claims.263 Actual class action settlement practice has opened the door to
serious charges about the validity or legality of class actions in negative-value
cases. First, in such cases, generally only a small percentage of a settlement is
actually distributed to class members,264 and, instead, increasingly the entire
settlement or the residual is awarded to a charity under the cy pres doctrine.265
262

376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (second emphasis added).
See discussion supra notes 196–99; see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338–40
(1980) (Burger, C.J.) (“The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it
is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ
the class-action device.”); Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 674, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013)
(explaining how classes actions are needed for small-value claims).
264 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105 (2010); see also In re Baby
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2013).
265 A cy pres remedy is an equitable doctrine imported into the class action context from trusts and estates
law. It is French for “as near as possible.” Settlement agreements may provide for cy pres distribution of
residual unclaimed funds. See Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 42–44 (2012) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy,
Northwestern University School of Law) (explaining the doctrine and decrying the use of cy pres in class
actions); see also, e.g., In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 171–73, 178 (approving a limited use of cy pres
distributions and questioning (in non-CAFA context) whether fees could be based on cy pres distribution);
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing relationship between attorneys’ fees and
263
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Professor Redish argues that class actions are essentially a method for
redistributing wealth from corporations to lawyers and, increasingly, charities,
with only minimal amounts going to actually injured class members.266 He
claims that it is a perversion of the substantive law to enable Rule 23, a
procedural tool, to enhance remedies in this way.267 In his view, class actions
are too often “faux class action[s]” because there are no real benefits to class
members.268 Professor Redish’s arguments may well be taken up by the United
States Supreme Court in the near future. The Court denied the petition for a
writ of certiorari arising from Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,269 but Chief Justice
Roberts, citing Professor Redish, wrote a statement respecting the denial of
certiorari in which he invited a proper case:
I agree with this Court’s decision to deny the petition for
certiorari. [Petitioner]’s challenge is focused on the particular
features of the specific cy pres settlement at issue. Granting review of
this case might not have afforded the Court an opportunity to address
more fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in
class action litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be
considered; how to assess its fairness as a general matter; whether
new entities may be established as part of such relief; if not, how
existing entities should be selected; what the respective roles of the
judge and parties are in shaping a cy pres remedy; how closely the
goals of any enlisted organization must correspond to the interests of
the class; and so on. This Court has not previously addressed any of
these issues. Cy pres remedies, however, are a growing feature of
class action settlements. In a suitable case, this Court may need to
clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.270

cy pres award in doomed settlement). But see Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming cy pres settlement over objection that newly minted charity had ties to defendant); In re Lupron
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 36–39 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding cy pres distribution but
criticizing district court for over involvement in picking charity).
266 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of
Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 117–18 (noting the willingness of plaintiffs’
attorneys in class actions to “subordinate the interests of class members” to attorneys’ self-interests (quoting
John C. Coffee, Jr. Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371–72 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
267 See Hearing, supra note 265, at 39–40.
268 Id. at 40.
269 See Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
270 Id. at 8 (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (citing Martin H. Redish, Peter
Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and
Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653–56 (2010)).
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Perhaps, though, technology will save small-value class action cases and
help avoid the cy pres problem. Increasingly, in our “Big Brother” world,
companies know more and more about their consumers. Thus, it should be
easier for corporations to provide information about the members of the class
and to get any recovery from a settlement to the class. In fact, recently, I
received two checks, each for about $35. I was not aware I was a member of a
class involving a bank from which I had obtained funding for a house. And,
even if I had any awareness whatsoever that the bank had violated some
statute, I am not the sort of “lunatic” that would have sued on my own or opted
out of a class. Yet, thanks to a class action and the lawyers who brought it, a
bit of dinner money came streaming my way.
2. Public v. Private Enforcement
The debate about cy pres awards, and the idea that class actions in
negative-value cases violate the Rules Enabling Act because they are
substantive in nature, raises the question whether the rights involved in such
cases ought to be vindicated via public, rather than private, enforcement.271
However good this may sound in the abstract, it is not practical for several
reasons. First, Professor Arthur Miller has observed that the United States has
always looked to private enforcement since its founding.272 Even former Chief
Justice Warren Burger understood that regulatory actions were insufficient to
protect rights and that class actions may be necessary to remedy injuries in
certain kinds of cases.273
It seems that distrust of government led us from the founding of the United
States through the New Deal and even now to rely on private enforcement
rather than public enforcement. Moreover, even if public enforcement is more
desirable from a democratic perspective, can we afford it? During these lean
times and times of partisan government, it is unimaginable that taxpayers or
legislators would devote the resources necessary to accomplish regulatory
aims. As discussed below, something like qui tam actions, where the
government essentially deputizes a private citizen to pursue vindication of

271 See Redish, supra note 266, at 73 (stating that class action practice transforms the underlying
substantive law).
272 Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 599 (2011).
273 See supra note 263.
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statutory rights, may hold some promise.274 But, expecting regulatory agencies
themselves to take on the work done by the private bar is not at all realistic.
In addition, there is a question whether private or public enforcement does
a better job of deterring future wrongdoing. For example, The New York Times
business section published a story entitled “Surprise, Surprise: The Banks
Win.”275 The article describes a potential settlement between federal regulators
and various banks involved in the mortgage foreclosures arising out of the
economic meltdown in 2008.276 Individuals whose homes were improperly
foreclosed upon would receive a total of $3.75 billion in cash.277 The
settlement provided that another $6.25 billion would go towards principal
reduction for homeowners in distress.278 A “back-of-the-envelope” analysis,
however, suggested that if half of the 4.4 million homeowners involved in the
foreclosure process were subjected to abuses, then each homeowner would
receive an average payment of less than $2,000.279 If only 10% were subject to
abuses, each would receive an average payment of $8,500.280 Thus, as the title
of the article suggests, this is a better deal for the banks than it is for the
consumers.
This Article suggests that governmental enforcement does not do a great
job of vindicating rights and raises an important question: Would the private
plaintiffs’ class action bar have negotiated a better deal for a class of
homeowners? Indeed, with fees at stake that are generally tied to the amount of
the recovery,281 class attorneys have an incentive to do a better job.
274

See infra at Part III.C.4.
Gretchen Morgenson, Surprise, Surprise: The Banks Win, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at BU1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/business/bank-settlement-may-leave-tiny-slices-of-a-smaller-pie.html.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 CAFA includes a “Consumer Bill of Rights’’ that, among other things, regulates attorneys’ fees in
coupon settlements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). Class actions, in which individual damages may be minimal
but in the aggregate huge, were of particular concern to CAFA’s drafters. Historically, these types of actions
have been one of the principal justifications for enabling class litigation, making it financially worthwhile to
pursue small, but widespread, abuse of consumers. Consumers have not always benefitted from the results
obtained in these types of class actions, however. In numerous cases, the result of massive class actions was
that consumers received a coupon of minimal value, while the class attorneys received millions of dollars in
fees. CAFA provides regulation of such coupon settlements. See id. at § 1712(a)–(c). The idea that attorneys’
fees ought to be tied to the actual recovery by the class was picked up in a non-CAFA context in In re Baby
Products Antitrust Litigation. 706 F.3d 217, 171–73, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (approving limited use of cy pres
distributions and questioning whether fees could be based on cy pres distribution).
275
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Additionally, a recent study shows that private enforcement can be more
effective than governmental enforcement in deterring future misconduct.282
3. Mass Actions and Quasi-Class Actions
Other alternatives to class actions are “mass actions” or “quasi-class
actions.” Indeed, as one of my co-panelists, Professor Linda Mullenix, has
written, mass actions and quasi-class actions are the future of aggregate
litigation.283 Plaintiffs’ lawyers, knowing that it was becoming more difficult
to get classes certified in federal courts, brought them in state courts.284
Congress responded in 2005 with CAFA, which allowed most class actions of
a national scope to be removed from state to federal court.285 Because plaintiffs
also sought to keep large cases out of federal court by filing complaints with
huge numbers of plaintiffs, Congress thus added the “mass action” provision to
CAFA.286 Because a mass action cannot be removed unless there are more than
100 named plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to file numerous complaints
involving subject matter naming fewer than 100 plaintiffs.287 And, the courts
have endorsed this tactic to avoid CAFA removal.288Accordingly, many of
these litigations will remain in state court. But the vast majority of cases of
national scope will find their way to federal court one way or the other.
Although some cases will remain in state courts, the federal courts continue
to be confronted with products liability cases that have a national impact in
which claimants are pursuing damages under state consumer protection laws.
282 See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315, 316–17 (concluding that, despite
the lack of respect for private antitrust enforcement, quantitative analysis demonstrates that private antitrust
enforcement “probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than the DOJ’s anti-cartel program”); see also
Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Antitrust Enforcement
(Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961669.
283 See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions Shrugged: Mass Actions and the Future of Aggregate Litigation,
32 REV. LITIG. 591, 645–47 (2013) (discussing the increasing importance of mass actions as an alternative
class actions).
284 See VAIRO, supra note 9, at 2–3 (remarking on the “unprecedented degree of forum shopping” in the
wake of Amchem undertaken by plaintiffs’ lawyers as they sought out state courts that “might be more
amenable to class certifications”).
285 See generally id. at 5–6 (highlighting the stated purposes of CAFA).
286 A “mass action” is defined as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of
law or fact” and where the claims in the mass action satisfy the $5 million jurisdictionally required amount. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4), (11)(B)(i) (2012).
287 See, e.g., Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009).
288 See id. at 950; see also Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 878–79, 885–86 (11th Cir. 2013);
Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 392–93 (7th Cir. 2010).

VAIRO GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/23/2014 12:10 PM

IS THE CLASS ACTION REALLY DEAD

519

The recent Toyota289 and NFL Players’ Concussion290 multidistrict litigations
(MDLs) are recent examples. These “litigations” may be a combination of
class actions filed in federal court, or removed from state court, and individual
actions filed in various jurisdictions. In such cases, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation is likely to transfer such federal cases to one federal
court for pretrial proceedings.291 And once there, enormous pressure to settle
exists even before any class is certified for prosecution purposes.
And deals are struck. Attorneys on the MDL Steering Committee negotiate
a deal. Even though individual plaintiffs are free to refuse to take what the
Steering Committee has negotiated because only class settlements are binding,
there is great risk in doing so. If most plaintiffs take the deal, the defendant can
then use their resources to litigate aggressively against the remaining
holdouts.292 While this is true as well for opt-outs in class actions, class action
members at least have the protections of Rule 23(e), which requires the district
court to approve the settlement as fair; Rule 23(g), which requires the court to
ensure that the class attorneys are going to adequately represent the class
members; and Rule 23(h), which requires the court to pass on the
reasonableness of class counsel’s attorneys’ fees.293 Thus, class members who
object can press their objections at the fairness hearing. No such protections
exist in a “quasi-class action,” although some judges at least have used their
inherent power to oversee fees.294

289 See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
704 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
290 In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d. 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
291 See, e.g., In re Toyota, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (transferring cases to the Central District of
California).
292 Class action and MDL settlements often contain a “right to withdraw” clause pursuant to which a
defendant will walk away from a settlement if too many claimants refuse to participate in the settlement fund.
See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 149, 217–18 (2003). Typically, the defendant will walk away unless over 90% of the plaintiffs will
participate. Sometimes the parties keep the number confidential. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 519, 521 (D. Md. 2002) (“[Class members] would have a right to opt out, and, if there
were a certain number of opt-outs . . . Microsoft would have the right to withdraw from the settlement.”). But,
the point is to ensure that the settlement effectively ends the litigation with the exception possibly of a
manageable number of individual cases remaining.
293 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (g), (h).
294 See supra note 13.
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4. Attorney General Parens Patriae Actions
As mentioned above, CAFA was designed to ensure that cases of
nationwide impact be litigated in federal, and not state, courts.295 Assuming, as
many plaintiffs’ lawyers do, that federal courts are less likely to certify a class
than state courts, and further assuming that state courts are more amenable to
group litigation, is there a mechanism for aggregating claims that is not a class
action or a mass action?
The State of Louisiana came up with a solution: suits filed by the state
attorney general in a parens patriae capacity. State attorneys general
frequently pursue litigation on behalf of their citizens in state courts. Is a case
filed by an attorney general removable under CAFA? The answer now is no, as
long as the attorney general files the right complaint. It took the Louisiana and
Mississippi Attorneys General three shots between to the two of them to get it
right, but in 2014, the Mississippi Attorney General hit the target.296
The first and second cases arose out of the Hurricane Katrina disaster.297 In
In re Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches, the Fifth Circuit held that a class
action filed by the Attorney General of Louisiana against over 200 insurance
companies for allegedly failing to pay covered insurance claims was properly
removed to federal court under CAFA.298 The suit had been filed in state court
on behalf of the State of Louisiana, together with a proposed class consisting
of certain citizens of Louisiana to whom insurance proceeds were due.299 The
defendants removed the case to federal court, and the district court denied the
attorney general’s motion to remand.300 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding
that although the State of Louisiana, as the named plaintiff, could not be
considered a citizen, the citizenship of the state–citizen class members could
be counted to determine whether CAFA’s minimal diversity existed.301
In re Katrina thus raised the possibility that a state could avoid removal by
suing in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of its citizens, instead of in a class
action. Under CAFA, only class actions and mass actions (where more than
295

See supra notes 284–86.
See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (holding that case brought
by state attorney general in parens patriae capacity is not subject to CAFA jurisdiction).
297 See In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008); Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
298 See 524 F.3d at 702.
299 See id.
300 Id.
301 See id. at 706.
296
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100 plaintiffs join together in an action) are removable. The Fifth Circuit,
however, put the kibosh on that approach as well, holding that CAFA
jurisdiction may exist over a state attorney general’s suit seeking recovery on
behalf of a group of individual citizens even if the suit is filed as a parens
patriae suit rather than as a class action.
In Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit
held that a state attorney general’s parens patriae action against a number of
insurers for alleged violation of Louisiana’s antitrust laws was a mass action
within CAFA jurisdiction because the individual policyholders were the real
parties in interest, at least with respect to treble damages sought by the attorney
general.302 However, the strong dissenting opinion presented the argument that
the case should be remanded because it did not qualify as a class action or a
mass action.303 And, all other courts of appeals that confronted the issue
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit majority.304 Given the split in the circuits, it
was simply a matter of time before the U.S. Supreme Court would resolve
matters, and it did so in 2014.
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., the Court adopted the
majority approach and held that a case in which the attorney general is the lone
plaintiff is not a mass action, even though the suit is brought for the benefit of
state citizens who far exceed the 100-person jurisdictional amount for CAFA
purposes.305 The issue of whether to allow removal of state attorney general
actions under CAFA has become increasingly important because these actions
can serve as a replacement, of sorts, for consumer class actions. As discussed
above, it is more difficult to certify litigation classes after the decisions in
Dukes, Comcast, and Concepcion have essentially eviscerated classwide
arbitration.306
In Hood, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court
held that only actual “plaintiffs” are to be considered in determining whether
the numerosity requirement for a mass action is satisfied.307 Therefore, a suit
filed by a state attorney general, with the state as the sole plaintiff, does not
302

536 F.3d 418, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 432–36 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
304 See Michael Jaeger, Note, Should They Stay or Should They Go: Can State Attorneys General Avoid
Removal of Parens Patriae Suits to Federal Court Under the Class Action Fairness Act?, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
327 (2012) (surveying cases and concluding that the Fifth Circuit approach is incorrect).
305 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014).
306 See supra Part II.
307 See Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 742.
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constitute a removable mass action.308 This is true even if relief is sought on
behalf of 100 or more of the state’s citizens, the mass action threshold under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).309
In Hood, the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi sued
manufacturers of liquid crystal displays (LCDs) in state court alleging that they
had formed an international cartel to restrict competition and raise prices in the
LCD market in violation of Mississippi law.310 The State sought injunctive
relief and civil penalties under state law, punitive damages, costs, attorneys’
fees, and restitution for purchases of LCD products by the state and its
citizens.311 The defendants removed the case to federal court.312 The district
court and the Fifth Circuit held that the case was removable under CAFA as a
mass action because 100 or more unidentified Mississippi consumers had
bought LCD screens and were therefore real parties in interest to the State’s
restitution claim.313 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case was not
a mass action because the State was the only plaintiff.314
Prior to the Court’s decision in Hood, the federal courts of appeals had
applied a real-party-in-interest analysis to determine whether a suit filed by a
state attorney general as a parens patriae action qualified as a mass action.315
However, the courts took two approaches in making this determination: the
“whole case” approach, which looks to the face of the complaint, and the
“claim-by-claim” approach, which looks to the actual real parties in interest.316
The whole case approach had become the majority rule, with the Fifth Circuit
the only real adherent to the claim-by-claim approach; Hood came out of the
Fifth Circuit.317
The Supreme Court in Hood rejected the claim-by-claim approach to the
real-party-in-interest analysis, holding instead that the “100 or more persons”
whose claims “are proposed to be tried jointly” must be actual plaintiffs, not
merely real parties in interest.318 The Court noted that “the statute says ‘100 or
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

See id. at 744–45.
See id. at 739.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 740–41.
Id. at 739.
See AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2012).
See id. at 391–92 (describing and discussing these two approaches).
See Jaeger, supra note 304, at 330 & nn.7–8.
See Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 739.
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more persons,’ not ‘100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest.’”319
Moreover, the “100 or more persons” referred to in the statute are the “very
‘plaintiffs’ referred to later in the sentence—the parties who are proposing to
join their claims in a single trial.”320
The Court also analyzed the term “plaintiffs.” The commonly accepted
meaning of the term, the Court explained, is the party who brings the suit.321
If “plaintiff,” as used in CAFA’s mass action definition, includes all unnamed
individuals with an interest in the suit, this would create “an administrative
nightmare that Congress could not possibly have intended.”322 This is because
the mass action provision also contains a jurisdictional limitation to “plaintiffs”
whose claims exceed $75,000.323 How would a district court know which
unnamed parties in interest met the jurisdictional threshold?324 Similarly, it
would be difficult for a court to decide whether transfer of a removed mass
action was permissible because such transfer is prohibited unless a majority of
the “plaintiffs” in the action request transfer.325
The Court also relied on the context in which CAFA was enacted. The
Court reasoned that “Congress’ overriding concern in enacting CAFA was
with class actions.”326 The mass action provision was included to act “as a
backstop to ensure that CAFA’s relaxed jurisdictional rules for class actions”
could not be evaded by naming 100 or more plaintiffs rather than filing suit as
a class action.327 If Congress had wanted to make representative actions
brought by a state as sole plaintiff removable under CAFA, it would have done
so directly through the class action provision, not indirectly through the
provision governing mass actions.328 In other words, the “if it walks like a
duck, it is a duck” argument did not fly.
The Court refused to infer a congressional intent that courts look behind the
pleadings to determine whether the numerosity requirement for a mass action
is satisfied.329 The Court acknowledged that courts are required to look behind
319
320
321
322
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325
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Id. at 742.
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See id. at 743.
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See id.
See id.
See id. at 744 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i) (2012)).
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See id. at 744–45.
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the pleadings in some circumstances to determine what parties’ citizenship
should be considered in determining diversity.330 However, this does not mean
that Congress intended to incorporate that background principle into the quite
different context of counting the number of parties in an action to determine if
the action is a mass action.331
Although the Court seemed agnostic in terms of the policies underlying
CAFA, and who may win or lose, the decision in Hood is very important for
many reasons. Claimants, not defendants, are likely to be the clear winner
overall. This is because of the potential of parens patriae actions to protect
consumer rights. Indeed, attorneys general often hire the same private
plaintiff’s lawyers who had been bringing class actions or mass actions in state
courts to prosecute these cases.332 The elephant in the room, which came up
during oral argument in Hood, is that private plaintiff class action lawyers
usually are hired by the attorneys general to litigate these cases.333 This fact
riles up defense counsel. Parens patriae actions to vindicate consumer rights
are a relatively new development, but the practice has been increasing over the
years, and Hood is likely to encourage more parens patriae actions.
Stakeholders understood the ramifications of Hood, and they weighed in
before the Supreme Court in force. For example, four amicus curiae briefs
were filed on behalf of Mississippi and five on behalf of the defendant LCD
manufacturers. The most notable amicus brief was that filed by forty-six states
in support of Mississippi.334 The state attorneys general argued that the Fifth
Circuit’s approach “upends entrenched principles of federal-state comity” and
forces states to litigate in federal court cases “they bring in their own courts,
under their own laws, for conduct occurring in their own borders.”335 The
AARP, Public Citizen, Inc., and the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust
330

See id.
See id. at 745–46.
332 See, e.g., Ashley L. Taylor, Jr., Walking a Tightrope: The Tension Between Attorneys General
Enforcement Authority and Contingency Fee Arrangements with Private Counsel, ST. & LOC. L. NEWS, Spring
2013, at 8, 8; Mark Schleifstein, Private Attorneys Working for Louisiana Attorney General Can Do So with
Contingency Fee Contracts, Judge Rules, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Mar. 10, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://
www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/private_attorneys_working_for.html; Alison Frankel, Should
State AGs Be Allowed to Use Contingency Fee Lawyers?, ON THE CASE BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012), http://blogs.
reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/12/20/should-state-ags-be-allowed-to-use-contingency-fee-lawyers/.
333 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), available at
http://op.bna.com/class.nsf/r?Open=jkas-9d7t7f.
334 Brief of Amici Curiae State of Illinois and 45 Other States in Support of Petitioner, Hood, 134 S. Ct.
736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 3935881.
335 Id. at 1.
331
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and Consumer Protection Laws Inc. also filed amicus curiae briefs in support
of Mississippi.336
On the other hand, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) argued that
CAFA was enacted to expand the ability of defendants to remove interstate
mass actions to federal court.337 The WLF argued that upending the Fifth
Circuit’s approach would allow attorneys general to evade Congress’s intent
by bringing parens patriae actions that seek monetary damages on behalf of its
citizens: “By strategically omitting the real parties in interest as named
plaintiffs in their complaints, state attorneys general (and their outside counsel)
have been able to obtain large jury awards against foreign defendants in local
courts.”338 The Defense Research Institute, Access to Courts Initiative, Inc. and
National Association of Manufacturers, Allstate Insurance Company, and
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America also filed amicus
curiae briefs in support of the defendants.339
Hood is a potential nightmare for defendants. The decision enhances the
incentive for state attorneys general to hire private, contingency-fee counsel to
bring parens patriae actions in state courts. If multiple state attorneys general
decide to attack the same product or practice, a defendant could be presented
with the prospect of defending potentially fifty state court parens patriae
actions.340
Hood also could provide an alternative to private class actions that would
otherwise be barred by Dukes, Comcast, or Concepcion. The decisions in
Dukes and Comcast lead to increased scrutiny of all aspects of Rule 23(a) and
23(b) class certification requirements, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
336 Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036); Brief of the
Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036).
337 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Hood, 134 S.
Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4855077.
338 Id. at 4–5.
339 Brief of DRI – The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hood, 134
S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4829338; Brief of Amici Curiae Access to Courts Initiative, Inc. et al. in
Support of Respondents, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4829339; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Allstate Insurance Co. in Support of Respondents, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4855076;
Brief for Amici Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America et al. in Support of
Respondents, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4875113.
340 Indeed, General Motors now faces the prospect of such a scenario. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, General
Motors Is Sued by Arizona for $3 Billion over Recalls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/business/arizona-sues-gm-for-3-billion-over-recalls.html.
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show commonality and predominance of common questions.341 A
parens patriae proceeding will not only be litigated in state court but also will
not be subject to these federal court class action trends.
The Supreme Court virtually eliminated class arbitration in Concepcion,
which prevented consumers with form-agreements with banks, telephone
companies, and the like from pursuing group vindication of low-value
claims.342 Here again, the Hood decision provides consumers with an end run:
the attorney general simply sues for them.
This in turn creates even more problems for defendants. A cable company,
for example, could face both class actions and parens patriae actions for the
same alleged conduct in different courts. Or, there could be follow-up class
actions after a successful attorney general action, if the judge in such follow-up
litigation applied offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. Indeed, Chief
Justice Roberts explored these and similar scenarios at oral argument in Hood.
He wondered whether an attorney general could file a parens patriae action
immediately following a class action settlement for the same alleged
conduct.343 Counsel for Mississippi responded by pointing out (among other
things) that the state’s interest in parens patriae actions is broader than those
of a class seeking damages to individual consumers as it includes, for example,
indirect harms.344 The concern about multiple actions was also reflected in
questions by Justices Scalia and Kennedy.345
It is also possible that Hood may lead to even more direct actions by
citizens on behalf of their counterparts. For example, California adopted a
novel approach to enforcing the Labor Code of California when it enacted the
PAGA.346 This law allows a private citizen to pursue civil penalties on behalf
of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA).347 In essence, an aggrieved employee is deputized to act as a Private
Attorney General if he or she first informs the LWDA of the alleged violations,
and the LWDA does not pursue the allegations or does not issue a citation
within certain time periods.348 As a Private Attorney General, the aggrieved
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348

See supra Part II.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 333, at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 19–20, 35.
See supra note 112.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2011).
Id. § 2699.3.
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employee is allowed to seek civil penalties not only for violations that he or
she personally suffered but also for violations of “other current or former
employees.”349 Unlike some private attorney general suits that usually refer to
some type of unfair competition claim, PAGA actually gives a private citizen
the right to pursue fines that would normally only be available to the State of
California. Thus, PAGA appears to allow a private citizen to act as an attorney
general. Any resulting civil penalties are split between the LWDA and the
employee with the LWDA receiving 75% of the penalties and the employee
receiving 25%.350
A defendant can argue that if it looks like a duck (class action), a PAGA
action is a duck (class action). A PAGA plaintiff, however, will argue that
Hood forecloses this argument because there is only one plaintiff named in the
complaint.
The bottom line of Hood is that, as a practical matter, it enhances the
incentive for private, contingency-fee counsel to pair with state attorneys
general and bring parens patriae actions in state court on behalf of state
citizens in tandem with or immediately following private class actions. This is
not what one would think defendants would want to see happen. Depending on
state attorneys general’s inclinations and the state legislation, it is quite
possible that defendants will be presented with something almost worse than
class actions. Instead of a bet-your-company scenario with respect to one
action, there could be fifty bet-your-company scenarios. Which attorney
general should the defendant settle with first? Settlement dynamics could be
even more complex than usual.
Clearly, therefore, state attorney general actions appear to be effective
vehicles for vindicating their citizens’ small claims and a potent and viable
alternative to class actions. However, returning to our Panel’s theme, is this
actually better for the “classes” represented by the state’s attorney general than
class actions would be? Will a state’s attorney general provide a check on their
private retained counsel that is more effective than that of the courts? As with
quasi-class actions, there is less judicial authority for intervention to protect
class members. There is no Rule 23(e), (g), or (h), for example.351 As Professor
349

Id. § 2699(a).
Id. § 2699(i).
351 See Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011)
(criticizing use of nonclass aggregate settlements because they fail to provide adequate protection for
claimants such as those contained in Rule 23).
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Adam Zimmerman has written, nonclass aggregate settlements often lack
transparency and accountability.352
CONCLUSION
While class actions for prosecution purposes have taken a huge hit, thanks
to Dukes and Concepcion, and while courts of appeals are reviewing class
settlements with a more skeptical eye, settlement classes continue to be
certified. Thus, there is a question whether these settlements are good or bad
for class members. In my view, distinctions need to be made between
high-value and low-value claims and class members. When individual or
groups of individuals have the incentive to go it alone, they ought to be able to
do that, and courts ought not routinely certify such classes. The use of MDL
may result in efficiencies with respect to discovery. However, class actions are
not designed to enable the fine brush of treating claimants with the
individualized justice they have a right to obtain.
In low-value claim cases, on the other hand, either a class action or some
substitute is necessary to vindicate whatever rights are at stake. Society cannot
wait for “lunatics” to preserve their rights. There needs to be a check on
conduct that nicks away at $5 or $30 per claimant. Class actions may not be an
optimal solution, but a quick review of some alternatives leads to the
conclusion that they are the lesser of a number of evils. Public enforcement is
not a promising alternative. On the other hand, parens patriae actions do hold
a great deal of promise on a state-by-state basis. However, from the defense
perspective, such actions may provide more problems than class actions: they
will not have support of the decisions in Dukes and Concepcion to help them
avoid group litigation, which ups the settlement ante. And, from the claimants’
perspective, it is also possible that the state citizens will be subject to the
vagaries of state politics when an elected official is calling the shots.
The bottom line is that there can be “no coming at justice” without
representative actions of some kind. So, choose your poison: Rule 23(b)(3),
quasi-class actions, attorney general parens patriae actions, or public
enforcement? I am of the view that Benjamin Kaplan had it right. Class actions
352 See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1992 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011); Adam S.
Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011); see also Margaret
H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 486 (2012).
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are needed to protect the rights of plaintiffs with minor damage claims
resulting from a defendant’s conduct. Let courts focus on the fairness of
settlements under Rule 23(e) and continue to make clear to class and defense
counsel what is fair and what is not, rather than questioning whether we ought
to have class actions at all.

